

SUBJECT: Article from DETROIT NEWS of Thursday, 21 July 1977 by  
Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr. (USMC, Ret.), News Military Analyst

Washington: Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner has placed his longtime "idea man" on the CIA payroll as the U.S. intelligence shakeup continues to mixed reviews.

The latest newcomer is Robert D. "Rusty" Williams, now on the government payroll at \$47,500 a year as special assistant to Adm. Turner. A systems analyst, he has been with the Admiral in a succession of assignments for at least a decade.

While his present job is to study past clandestine operations by the battered CIA, no one doubts that Williams is more able to influence Turner than any other person at the CIA.

To some observers, Williams is "a solid man." To others, at some point, he has seemed "a total disaster."

The Turner-Williams connection goes back to the days when Turner, then a bright, articulate commander and pioneer of Navy systems analysis, formed a deep professional friendship with Williams, who was then doing Navy work under contract from Stanford Research Institute (SRI).

Under the patronage of the former Chief of Naval Operations, ADM. E. R. Zumwalt, Turner rose rapidly, ascending from Captain to Vice-Admiral in four years. During this rise, which took the Admiral to some of the highest places in the Navy, Williams, frequently in some consultancy status, was never far away. He became, as one source put it, "Turner's single closest confidant on national security matters."

On leave of absence from SRI, Williams followed the Admiral to the latter's frequently stormy tour of duty as President of the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. While at the war college, Williams headed a new department of management and came under heavy criticism.

Whatever the facts of Williams' performance at Newport, which remain a matter of sharp controversy, he left his teaching post abruptly in one year.

Soon after, however, when Turner moved up to command the U.S. Second Fleet, Williams followed, this time in a government consultancy status.

"Stan values Rusty in a very private way," said one source. "He listens to him as he does to few others if any."

In Adm. Turner's latest assignment prior to the CIA--NATO Commander in the Mediterranean--there is no record of any official connection or employment of Williams, but all sources agree the two kept in close touch, with an uninterrupted idea-input on the part of the analyst.

When President Carter appointed Turner, his Naval Academy classmate, to his present post, Turner immediately drew some criticism, especially among CIA professionals, for bringing along a private retinue of naval officers who have been members of the Admiral's "team."

These, quickly nicknamed "the gang of seven," included a Navy Executive Assistant (Aide-de-Camp), a Navy appointments secretary, a Commander serving as speechwriter and adviser and a recently retired Naval Captain as Public Affairs Officer--the first such ever to bear that title in the Agency's tightlipped past. To this group, Williams' name is often added even though he is civilian.

That Williams' role will not be confined to sleuthing down past mistakes is generally agreed. How he will use his powerful influence with the Director of Central Intelligence, and to what purpose remains to be seen.

But Williams is now a fact of life at the CIA and, says one insider had better be taken seriously. "Wherever Stan goes or will go," he stated, "Rusty will show up."

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Executive Registry

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26 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs)

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

1. I accepted an invitation from Congressman Larry Winn to appear on his broadcast home TV show sometime in the next two weeks.

2. [ ] is working out the details of when.

3. Congressman Winn indicated he would send us the questions in advance.

4. I also had a phone call with Bob Heinl on the 25th of July. He indicated that his story on Rusty Williams had been published in The Detroit News last week. I'd like to get a copy of it. He asked if he could have an interview one of these days; I told him to be in touch with you and we would work it out.

[ ]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

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STEFAN KORBONSKI

Executive Registry

77-5273

STA

July 29, 1977

Dear Admiral Turner:

On July 24th I watched with interest your appearance on the TV program - "60 Minutes". I noted that in your reply to one of the questions you used the term "Ultra Secret" which is the title of F.W.Winterbotham's book dealing with the German code machine.

In view of the fact that I have recently published an article entitled "The True Story of ENIGMA - The German Code Machine in World War II" in the "East European Quarterly", I am attaching a copy of my article because of the possible interest you may have in this subject.

Sincerely yours

*Stefan Korbonski*  
Stefan Korbonski

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
MacLean, Va. 20505

P.S. Please, find enclosed too a photostat copy of Mr. Kahn's review and a copy of page 53 of "A Man Called Intrepid".

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*Public Affairs*


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Colonel Starfield Source

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Washington, D. C. 20505

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77-1673/1A

29 JUL 1977

Dear John,

Thanks so much for your letter of 20 June and the invitations to attend the Yama Conference and to speak at your Members Dinner. I'm afraid I have another commitment and will not be able to attend the Conference in November. However, I would like to tentatively accept the invitation to address your distinguished group on the 18th of January.

I will have someone on my staff contact your office this fall to confirm and make final arrangements.

In the meantime, thanks again and all the best.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. John G. Worssam  
The Conference Board  
845 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10022

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## THE CONFERENCE BOARD

Executive Registry

77-1673

June 20, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Stan:

It certainly was a pleasure to talk with you the other day and needless to say we are very disappointed that you are unable to be with us at Del Monte Lodge in September. I have taken the opportunity of enclosing a preliminary list of our participants.

I, also, am enclosing a list of our "Regional Type" meetings scheduled for the next twelve months here and abroad. We would again be delighted to have you as our guest at any meeting you so wish. Of the domestic meetings we like to suggest the Yama Conference beginning Friday evening November 11th. This meeting is limited to our Trustees and elected Members of the Corporation and the attendees are usually from all corners of the nation.

The other matter we discussed and I would like at this point of time "sign you up" as our speaker for our informal and off-the-record Members Dinner which is scheduled to be held Wednesday evening, January 18, 1978 here in New York City at The Waldorf-Astoria. In the past these meetings are usually attended from 125 to 150 Chief Executives and their guests. We ask the principal speaker to have a few opening remarks and be available to answer questions. The opening evening activities start with a cocktail hour at 6:00 p.m. and, traditionally, adjournment is no later than 9:00 p.m.

Kay Randall joins me in expressing our hope you will be able to do this and we look forward to hearing from you.

All best wishes,

Sincerely,

John G. Worssam  
Assistant Director  
Conference Division

JGW/vs  
enc.

THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK CAREY McWILLIAMS

# THE NATION

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
THE SOMOZAS OF NICARAGUA

Penny Lernoux

*have a session  
on this topic some  
day pls  
Stan*

8 AUG 1977

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EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

*Public Affairs*

## DEFENSE MISCALCULATIONS

**'Dollarizing' the Russian Forces**

EDWARD AERIE

In the summer of 1975, Department of Defense analysts sharply raised estimates of Soviet defense spending. Earlier CIA estimates of this spending were condemned, both as understating the cost of Soviet defense in relation to the American and as minimizing the share of Soviet gross national product (GNP) falling to defense outlays. After joint discussions, the CIA in the spring of 1976 acceded to the Defense Department's evaluation and confessed that it had underestimated Soviet defense spending for the past decade. In official releases and newspaper accounts it was acknowledged, as a shy afterthought, that the new figures in no way indicated a revision of the previously estimated size of the Soviet military effort, but only of its cost. Nevertheless, these estimates were equated with a Soviet "military buildup," a description frequently preceded by the adjectives "rapid," "massive," "unprecedented" or "relentless." As observed by ex-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the public was given "a water treatment" of continual repetition of this equation, so that the concepts of quantity and expense blended in the public consciousness.

The new estimates and the Soviet military buildup they insinuated were well publicized during late 1975 and early 1976 and helped the Ford administration to gain Congressional approval of its "turn-around" defense budget in 1976, despite the strong domestic and international vectors pointing to an expected retrenchment in defense priorities. Since that time the asserted surge in Soviet military spending has been accepted as self-evident by liberals and conservatives, doves and hawks, humble reporters and editorial pundits alike—a somewhat baffling unanimity, since the new estimates are not based on new facts but derive their force from renovated assumptions and slackened categorizations. Conventional skeptics of even the old official estimates yielded to the new, as though they had collapsed from mental fatigue.

The manifesto of the expanded estimates of Soviet defense expenditure was an essay, "Comparisons of U.S. and S.U. Defense Expenditures" by Dr. Andrew W. Marshall, director of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense, published in the fall of 1975 in a report of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on allocation of resources in the Soviet Union and China. Marshall disparaged the CIA estimates which, in his view, had applied U.S. costs too sparingly to Soviet defense and had failed to spot the total resources absorbed by Soviet defense. Whereas the latest (1974) CIA estimate of Soviet spending stood at about 119 percent of American spending, Marshall suggested a percentage of 130 to 150. The proportion of Soviet GNP consumed by defense, which the CIA had reported as 6 to 8 percent for recent years, Marshall rejected in favor of a proportion

of 10 to 20 percent. Marshall's re-evaluation became the buttress for the new coordinated CIA-Defense Department estimates issued in February and May 1976 and January 1977; even his percentages constitute, with some refinement, the framework of these estimates.

Official appraisers of Soviet defense spending obtain their jobs because the USSR's policy is to keep its specific defense data secret. The only expenditure information published in the Soviet press is the annual overall budgetary appropriation for defense. This appropriation nearly doubled between 1960 and 1970 (after decreasing by 17 percent between 1952 and 1960), but stabilized at 17.9 billion rubles between 1970 and 1973 and dropped to 17.7 billion in 1974, 17.4 billion in 1975 and 1976, and 17.2 billion for 1977.

American estimators dispute this trend, claiming a steady increase in Soviet spending for the 1970-76 period, at 3 percent annually under the old CIA estimates and 4 to 5 percent under the new. The difference between these two growth estimates, as in the magnitude estimates, is purely a matter of re-evaluating cost, not quantity, though the old estimates are misleadingly portrayed as failing to reflect the intensity of the Soviet "buildup." The Soviet budgetary figures, which contradict them both, are of course dismissed as propaganda by the Americans.

From numerous studies made in the West of Soviet defense spending, one may distinguish three levels of estimating or evaluating defense expenditure: (1) the output level, or what the Soviets provide in military strength; (2) the input level, or the direct cost of producing and utilizing the military output annually budgeted, and (3) the burden level, or the ultimate cost to the society of supporting the military establishment, often conceived as an "opportunity cost," or what must be foregone as a result of defense outlays.

The main concern in budgeting the American national defense should be the first or output level of estimation. Threat to national security stems from the size of the opponent's defense effort, not from its cost or burden. The nation should have a collateral interest in the second or input level of the opponent's defense, not to gauge threats but to compare defense efficiencies of both sides in order to spot waste or uneconomical practices. The third or burden level of estimating has no practical bearing on our own defense budgeting, except perhaps to place in the public mind a psychological inflation of the opponent's militaristic determination. Nor can the total burden of defense really be measured. Ultimate costs rely too much upon unpredictable political, sociological and psychological factors to judge their bearability, and have a tendency to enlarge in direct proportion to the estimator's distrust of the Soviet Union. In effect, burden estimates have been ideological exercises to support preformed judgments about Soviet militarism and civilian ne-




glect. (Burden of defense since World War II is the obsolescence of the total capital stock, the bulk of inflation, and the decay of the urban infrastructure. While it may be disputable to charge such a steep cost to defense alone, some of the standard assertions about the Soviet defense burden are at least as disputable.)

In estimating the output level of Soviet defense, the CIA prices and aggregates output units—men, weapons and operations—in dollars, that is, in the prices that the United States would have to pay to finance them. In estimating the input and burden levels, U.S. intelligence estimates the costs in rubles in order to obtain an aggregate view of what the Soviets pay and sacrifice for their annual defense outlay.

The greater part of Andrew Marshall's exposition deals with the costs and burdens rather than the substance of Soviet defense. His thrust is to prove that they have been sorely underestimated by the CIA. In order to accept his conclusion, one must first accommodate a host of assumptions, some of them original, some of them used more sparingly in the old estimates, and all of them weakly grounded in fact.

These assumptions include the notion that the dispersal of Soviet industry is determined by military strategy, implying that the dispersal is uneconomic and to that extent a "military" burden. Another assumption is that the expenses of maintaining a military presence on the Sino-Soviet border are "extraordinary," even if completely unknown. Marshall refers to "new information," not specified, that suggests that the Soviet defense industry is less efficient than formerly thought by American intelligence and therefore a greater drain on resources than earlier indicated (a case of one assumption displacing another). The fact that recently observed Soviet troop carriers and antiaircraft guns are more elaborate, and therefore more expensive, than had been suspected is used to deduce that the whole spectrum of Soviet arms costs more than the CIA had calculated. Marshall also asserts, with no direct supporting data, that the prices of weapons, in the Soviet Union are subsidized and not determined, as in this country, by "market forces." (One wonders what market forces operate in the pre-assigned, profit-laden defense contracts let by the Pentagon.) He repeats a well-frayed assumption that military research and development (R&D) receives the cream of Soviet scientific talent, laboratory equipment and other scarce resources. This assertion is aided by the conventional estimator practice of loosely labeling as "military" all R&D with any remotely military potential—which would include the best endowed research in any industrial society. Finally, with superb casuistry, Marshall argues that the opportunity cost of maintaining a serviceman is higher in the Soviet Union than in the United States, since the Soviet economy is labor-short while the American economy has a surplus of labor and can more easily spare a worker from the civilian sector. A strange argument against full employment!



Even those able to digest these assumptions should feel their credulity strained when the assumptions are translated with so much assurance into numbers—into so many rubles and such and such a proportion of GNP. This is especially so because the old estimates, revised on the basis of the assumptions, were based on assumptions or degrees of assumption of their own.

The CIA's new ruble estimates of Soviet spending incorporate the insights developed or refurbished by Marshall. Before 1976 the CIA was less quick than the Department of Defense to write off the published Soviet defense budget. In its pre-1976 estimates the CIA accepted it as a basis for the actual ruble outlay, but arbitrarily added two-thirds of the Soviet science budget as presumed military R&D, thus bringing total defense spending up to 26 billion to 29 billion rubles between 1970 and 1975. But in 1976 the CIA, having adopted the new Marshallian ground rules, raised its estimate to 50 billion to 55 billion rubles for 1975—almost double the old estimate. In effect, the new estimate accused the Soviet Union of concealing or underpricing about two-thirds of its defense outlay.

The CIA's estimate of Soviet defense spending in 1975 was \$124 billion in current prices. Thus, in the sphere of defense the ruble is assigned the purchasing power of about \$2.50. (The official exchange rate of \$1.34 to the ruble is irrelevant here since it does not reflect the ruble's purchasing power for all types of goods and services.) The dollar estimates are made by measuring the output level of defense—that is, by adding together the physical counts of Soviet defense components made by U.S. intelligence, and assigning American prices to them. Marshall does not quarrel with the counts of Soviet defense elements, only with their dollar assessment. To fathom his dissatisfaction with the dollar estimates one must digress to examine the CIA's methodology of dollar estimation.

The CIA's procedure, as explained in June 1975



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*Available*

former Director William Colby, is to "estimate what it would cost in the United States to develop, procure, and man a military force of the same size and with the same inventory of weapons as that fielded by the Soviets. We also figure in what it would cost to operate that force as the Soviets do." This procedure, which in principle might be adequate to produce a rough comparison of aggregate Soviet and U.S. defense spending, is flawed by two biases that work, as might be expected, in the direction of exaggeration—even in the CIA's pre-1976 estimates.

The first bias is that the dollar estimates assign to the Soviet military effort the generally higher real costs of the American effort. When "dollarizing" Soviet defense it is thought necessary to invest it with the relative extravagances that suffuse American defense, but are absent or restrained in the Soviet Union—the high salaries of volunteer troops as against the paltry allowances to Soviet conscripts; the cost of developing, producing, and maintaining a more sophisticated overall system of weaponry; high profit margins of U.S. defense corporations, and the logistical dispersion and foreign rental payments entailed by American overseas bases. Any increases in U.S. costs or troop pay automatically produce an increase in estimated Soviet defense spending, even though the Soviet Union may not have spent an extra ruble between annual estimates. The CIA, it is true, makes some downward adjustments in the conversion to dollars by taking account of Soviet differences in areas such as weapon design and personnel perquisites, where a lower input is made per unit of output than in this country.

But these adjustments only skim over the surface. They do not touch the deeper differences caused by the American tradition of political largesse for defense interests and the U.S. "forward" global defense strategy. Accordingly, the generally simpler design and construction of Soviet arms, if known and measurable, entitle them to a lower dollar manufacturing cost than analogous American arms. But the American institutional price structure, which rests upon the lesser efficiency of defense industry relative to civilian industry, high profits and lax procurement practices, is fully transferred by the CIA to the Soviet Union setting. It is doubtful that the CIA makes sufficient, if any, discounts for the high use costs per man and weapon imposed by the American forward defense system. Furthermore, the CIA discounts are highly eclectic. They include, for instance, reductions in certain manpower costs, such as health care, pensions and aid to dependents, but no reductions are made in salaries, allowances and food costs, which are similarly much smaller per capita in the Soviet armed forces than in ours.

The second bias derives from the fact that the numbers of Soviet military components—men and weapons—by which dollar costs per component are multiplied must themselves be estimated on the basis of intelligence, since they are not revealed by the Soviet Union. These component estimates are the basis of the annual posture statements for the Soviet Union made by the Department of Defense. The intelligence is gathered and interpreted not only by the CIA but by the entire intelligence com-

munity, including the Department of Defense. The nature of this information or even what is done with it is, for the most part, tightly classified, so that any outside analysis or verification is barred, except occasionally to screened and cleared observers of hard-line orientation. One can only trust that the data are treated objectively and that the inferences drawn from them are no more than the data can bear. Annual Soviet arms production, for example, not being published in the Soviet Union, is probably deduced from random observations, such as defector reports, level of equipment of visible military units, and satellite photographs. If the amount of annual production of a particular weapon is estimated on the basis of such observations, what is the quality of the conclusions that intervene between observation and estimate—how typical is the observed military unit, how reliable is a defector's supportive information, what is the annual replacement rate of the weapon in question, what is the proportion of new to older weapons?

The treatment currently given estimated military manpower does not lend confidence in this regard. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the festering Sino-Soviet tension during the past decade and a half, the number of Soviet men under arms has remained highly stable since 1959 at roughly 3.6 million (3.65 million in 1976), according to Soviet census data and the updating estimates of the prestigious British International Institute for Strategic Studies. The CIA and the Defense Department, on the contrary, have claimed an alarming growth in the number of servicemen to 4.8 million in 1976. Before 1976 the CIA had placed the number at about 4.2 million, but only by adding to the British estimate internal security personnel and border guards, whose mission is not warfare and who could be shifted to combat status no more readily than National Guardsmen and civilian police in Western countries. The extra 600,000 men added in 1976 were obtained, as lynx-eyed Rep. Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee spotted, by reclassifying that many civilians in the Soviet Ministry of Defense as members of the armed services. In the much more variegated sphere of weaponry, the possibilities for such estimating maneuvers are almost infinite.

How then do these characteristics of inflation in the CIA's dollar estimates square with Marshall's contention that the estimates understate the dollar cost of Soviet defense? Essentially, Marshall's argument ignores the first bias of the dollar estimates (attribution of U.S. real costs to Soviet defense) and refuses to entertain the second bias (likely tendentiousness in defense component estimates). He does not deny, but has no interest in, the tendency of CIA dollar estimates to raise the general level of real costs in the Soviet context. His criticism is vented on the discounts that the CIA makes in partial adjustment to Soviet reality. For Marshall the calculation of real Soviet defense costs, no matter how limited this calculation by the CIA really is, is not the proper purpose of the dollar estimates—discounting the dollar price of a Soviet defense component is justified only if the discount reflects a military inferiority, not a lower real cost. The true aim of dollarization, according to Marshall,

should be to determine the hypothetical cost to the United States of duplicating the whole Soviet defense package ("the physical dimensions and operation capabilities of the Soviet military"). This implies that, because U.S. institutions, practices, living standards and social constraints are different from those of the Soviets, the United States cannot possibly reproduce the Soviet package at their lower real costs. Things simply cost more in the United States, and if this fact is not woven into the dollar estimates, Soviet spending is underestimated in relation to the outlays required by the United States to match it. The unstated premise of this thesis is that only by emerging with the necessary price to the United States of imitating the estimated Soviet defense performance, no matter how steep this price, do we have a good measure of the threat of Soviet defense to the United States and of the resources that must be assigned to neutralize the threat.

Marshall has succeeded inadvertently in exposing a key fallacy of the traditional CIA methodology of dollar estimation: the CIA, through its spotty, inconsistently selective, and superficial system of dollar discounts, has created a meaningless kaleidoscope of real and unreal costs in producing its picture of Soviet defense spending. It manages neither to portray the real total cost of defense to the Soviets in dollars, nor to pinpoint the actual price that the United States would have to pay to re-

peat the presumptive Soviet effort. It overestimates the former and underestimates the latter, assuming constancy of standard American inputs.

Marshall's intricate and painstaking rationale, whatever his own policy views, has been used simplistically in the past year and a half by advocates of high defense spending to make the abstract cost of duplicating Soviet defense the test of national security. The Soviet defense package, as measured, appraised and inflated by the estimators, is a sort of free-floating platonic model, as though the differing environments of the two powers are mere accidents of logic rather than the essence of different security needs. A whole armory of questions, more pertinent to budgeting, lie begged or ignored. These concern the nature of reasonably probable Soviet intentions, the likely need and use of various defense components in contingent interactions between the two countries, the quality and purpose of analogous components on both sides, the output weights of the Soviets' other opponents added to the United States end of the military balance, political needs and constraints related to defense spending, the possibility of economizing by substituting cheaper defense inputs and outputs even in the American context, and recourse to mutual disarmament. Such difficult questions cannot begin to be answered by impulsively duplicating or exceeding uncertain Soviet numbers and their hypothetical aggregated value.

## GIVING UP ON THE PROBLEM

# LIFE ON THE JOB

**BILL SMOOT**

Only a few years ago quality of work was a national issue, with dozens of articles on the "blue-collar blues" and the "white-collar woes," with Congressional hearings and government reports and special conferences on job enrichment. In 1972 HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson warned that we had become "perilously estranged" from the effect of unfulfilling work on the quality of our lives; he was encouraged by the renewed interest and confident that the problem would be conquered. That same year Sen. Edward Kennedy introduced into Congress the Worker Alienation Research and Technical Assistance Act, declaring, "The issue of job discontent—its cost, its character, its implications, and its solutions—will not fade away or be brushed aside."

But the problem was not conquered, and whether it faded away or was brushed aside, it is no longer part of the kind of public discourse that stimulates people and institutions to take action. We are once again "perilously estranged" from the issue of boring, meaningless, unfulfilling work.

The recession that began in late 1974 no doubt contributed to the disappearance of the issue. With more than 7 million Americans jobless, attention naturally turns to creating more jobs, not better ones. But quality of work

was already fading on its own; and the deeper reason for its demise is that it came to be seen as a *problem without a solution*. Where commentators had once drawn attention to the tragedy of lives wasted in unfulfilling work, they now chorused a sentiment most succinctly expressed in the title of a book by Sar Levitan and William Johnston: *Work Is Here to Stay, Alas*.

The rise and fall of the work issue is a story worth telling for three reasons: first, to show that concern for the quality of work was not a fad but rooted in a deep contradiction between the evolving character of the American people and the work situation to which they give the greater, if hardly the better, part of their lives; second, to detail how business, government and labor failed to respond adequately to a fundamental problem we face as a people, and finally, to suggest that this failure reflected the narrowness of the area of discourse in which the country confronts its serious social problems.

Quality of work, which ignited as an issue in the early 1970s, had begun to smolder in the student protest movement of the 1960s. In 1962 the Port Huron Statement

Bill Smoot is a writer living in Berkeley, Calif. He has taught at Miami University and Northwestern University where he received his Ph.D. He is a member of New American Movement. Jack Metzgar made significant contributions

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B. DALE DAVIS  
Executive Editor

July 29th, 1977

Adm. Stansfield Turner  
Director, Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia

Dear Adm. Turner,

The Bulletin is preparing a series of articles examining the Central Intelligence Agency today -- at a crossroads and under new management -- and the effect of the turbulent recent years on the American intelligence community.

To do the job properly, we need to hear from people within the intelligence community, those who will chart its course the next few years. Critics, observers, and users of American intelligence of every persuasion are available to the press in abundance. And we have talked to many of them. It is not so easy to obtain the views of American intelligence officials. But we would be remiss if we did not try for the balanced picture.

If your schedule will permit, I would like to have Bulletin reporters hear your views on the proper functions and obligations of American intelligence, how it is likely to change in the years ahead, what special problems and challenges it will face, how it can regain the confidence of the American people.

Naturally, such a session would be at your convenience as to time and place. I am sure satisfactory ground rules can be worked out as to what is or is not on the record.

I hope you will be able to honor this request. I am sure it would be in the best interests of the people of our large circulation area to know more about their intelligence service, its goals, its problems, and the people who run it.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

*B. Dale Davis*

B. Dale Davis

BDD/bs

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## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

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12	IG				
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
Executive Secretary

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Date

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



PA  
13 July

29 JUL 1977

Mr. Edward B. Atkeson  
Vestryman  
St. John's Church  
Lafayette Square  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Atkeson,

Thanks so much for your invitation to address the Forum of St. John's Church this fall. I accept with pleasure.

With regard to the dates you mentioned, I would prefer November 6th. If that is not convenient, October 30th would be the alternate choice.

My staff will be in touch with you to work out the final details. Thank you again for the invitation and I look forward to meeting you in November.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

A/DCI/PAO/HEH/kgt/25 July 1977

Distribution:

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

Paul Atkeson

JOHN'S CHURCH  
LAFAYETTE SQUARE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

REVEREND JOHN C. HARPER, D.D., RECTOR

July 13, 1977

The Honorable Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

Each Sunday from September to May, the Forum of St. John's Church invites distinguished speakers to address a group of interested parishioners at 10 a.m. at the Parish House at 1525 H Street, N.W. Normally the speakers devote about twenty minutes to their remarks and an equal amount of time to answering questions related to their talks.


This year three Sundays will be devoted to discussions of "Ethics in the Professions." On behalf of the Forum, I would like to invite you to speak to the group on ethics in the intelligence profession. Any one of the following dates would be suitable:

October 23d  
October 30th  
November 6th

In view of the difficulty which some speakers have in adhering to a date set three months in advance, it is generally desirable to establish both a primary and an alternate date, affording some last-minute flexibility.

Guests frequently elect to attend one of the morning services; one is held at 9 a.m., another at 11 a.m. Refreshments are served following the 11 o'clock service in the Parish House. You would be very welcome to attend or not, as you please. We hope you can join us.

Sincerely,

  
Edward B. Atkeson  
Vestryman



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